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Chapter 5
Employee Decisions with Respect to
401 (kJ Plans
Andrea L. Kusko, James M. Poterba, and
David W Wilcox

In the last decade, 401 (k) plans have grown rapidly. These plans, also
known as cash and deferred compensation accounts, permit individuals
to defer taxes on current earnings and to earn pretax returns on their
retirement savings. Most employers who offer 401 (k)s also match at least
part of their employees' contributions to these plans. In 1993, the most
recent year for which data from Form 5500 has been tabulated, contributions to 401 (k) plans totalled $69.3 billion, substantially greater than the
$52.1 billion that employers contributed to defined benefit pension
plans. The number of active participants in 401 (k) plans grew from 7.5
million in 1984 to 23.1 million in 1993 (USDOL, 1996).
In spite of the popularity of 401 (k) plans, there is no consensus on how
plan characteristics, such as the employer match rate or the IRS- and
employer-imposed limits on worker contributions, affect 401 (k) contributor behavior. These issues are central to understanding the rapid
growth of these plans, to assessing the impact of poten tial legislative
changes on participation in these plans, and to evaluating the impact of
employer-initiated campaigns to affect employee participation (see Him
and Turner, this volume). Two studies that explore the relationship between 401(k) plan characteristics and contribution decisions are Andrews (1992) and Papke (1995). The former constructs a proxy for the
employer match rate based on a question on the May 1988 CurrentPopulation Survey (CPS) about whether the employer as well as the employee
contributes to the 401 (k) plan, and then uses this variable to estimate
401 (k) contribution equations. Andrews' results suggest that employee
participation rates are higher when the employer offers a matching contribution, but that contribution rates conditional on participation are
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lower. One less than fully satisfactory aspect of the CPS data is that they
include neither the rate at which employers match employee contributions nor the fraction ofemployees for whom the employer match applies
at the margin. The latter deficiency is potentially important because
many employers match contributions only up to a fixed fraction of the
employee's salary.
Papke (1995) estimates contribution equations using a data set based
on the Forms 5500 that pension plans file with the Internal Revenue
Service. She studies the relationship between the average contribution
per plan member and the ratio of employer to employee contributions,
the average employer match rate. She finds a positive association between average match rates and employee contributions at low match
rates, but a negative relationship at match rates above 50 percent. These
correlations might not represent the true behavioral response of contributions to changes in the match rate, however, if average and marginal
match rates are different. For example, it could be that employers with
more generous match rates set a lower cap on the fraction of employee
compensation that they will match. In this case, cross-sectional comparisons of 401 (k) plans could spuriously show a negative correlation
between the match rate and the amount contributed to the plan.!
More generally, self-selection makes it difficult to evaluate crosssectional evidence on the correlation between contribution rates and
plan characteristics. If some firms institute high match rates or offer to
match a high percentage of salary in order to attract workers who are
interested in saving and therefore value these benefits, then the observed
correlation between these plan features and contribution rates may simply reflect the nature of equilibrium matching between workers and
firms, not the effect of match rates on contribution decisions. Ippolito
(1993) argues that precisely such self-selection explains the rapid increase in the popularity of 40 I (k) s. He postulates that workers who
value retirement saving are on average better workers than their "shorthorizon" counterparts, and that by offering a 401 (k) plan, an employer
can attract and retain high-quality workers. Poterba, Venti, and Wise
(1996) present some evidence, based on comparisons between 401(k)
eligibles and not-eligibles in the mid-1980s, suggesting that such selection effects are not empirically important. The importance of selection
effects nevertheless remains an unresolved issue.
Papke (1995) is the only researcher who has considered self-selection
effects in an empirical analysis of contribution decisions. In an extension
of the results described above, she relates changes in average contributions at a set of plans to changes in match rates at the same plans, and thus
controls for time-invariant employee characteristics and plan-specific effects. The resulting estimates, while less precise than her findings in the
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cross-section, continue to suggest a positive, then negative, association
between match rates and contributions as the match rate increases. 2
The present chapter differs from other recent studies of 401 (k) contributors in that it exploits panel data on the 401 (k)-related decisions of
indh;duals at a single medium-sized manufacturing firm.' Our goal is to
investigate the determinants of 401 (k) participation and contribution
rates and the dynamics of 401 (k) contributor behavior. Employee records are an excellent data source for investigating some issues relating to
401 (k) plans and a very poor data source for others. On the one hand,
our use of these data insulates us from the problems of plan-specific
effects and selection bias noted above. Moreover, these data provide very
detailed information on the patterns of 401 (k) contributions across age
and income classes within the firm, and on how individual employees
change their participation and contribution status when the plan's structure changes. Clark and Schieber (this volume) and Goodfellow and
Schieber (l996) examine similar data sets for a larger set of firms.
The disadvantage of firm-level data, however, is that they prm;de only
an incomplete profile of the household setting in which individuals make
decisions about retirement saving. These data do not give us any information on household income received from sources other than the firm
from which the data have been collected. Retirement plan data also lack
information on household assets or liabilities other than those held in
the plan, and thus provide a more limited sketch of the household balance sheet than some household surveys.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first summarizes the basic
structure ofthe 401 (k) plan at the firm we analyze and presents summary
statistics on participation and contribution rates. The next section examines the importance of contribution limits, both those imposed by the
401 (k) plan itself and those imposed by the IRS, in influencing contributor behavior. We then present simple tabulations showing the correlation
between employee age, income, and contribution rates. We compare
these with the results in other studies that could not control for plan
characteristics. The next section sketches the dynamics of participation
and demonstrates that there is substantial inertia in 401 (k) contributor
behavior. Most employees who contribute in one year also contribute in
the next year, and they typically contribute the same share of salary in
both years, even though the match rate at the firm varied substantially
between years. There is a brief conclusion.

An Overview of the 401

fkJ

Plan at Firm X

Our data set contains information on employee contributions to a
401 (k) plan at a medium-sized manufacturing firm, which we shall refer
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to as "Firm X," in four consecutive years. In three of the four years for
which we have data, the plan offered an employer match on contributions up to the first 6 percent of eligible compensation, defined as regular
base compensation including some commissions but excluding bonuses
and overtime. Employees were allowed to defer up to 10 percent of eligible compensation, but contributions in excess of 6 percent were not
matched.
One of the unusual features of the 401 (k) plan at Firm X is substantial
volatility in the employer match rate. During the first three years of our
sample, the match rate was linked to Firm X's earnings per share in the
previous calendar year, and the firm's earnings performance during this
period resulted in large changes in the match rate. Between April 1, 1987
and March 31, 1988, the match rate was 25 percent. It increased to 65
percent on April 1, 1988, and then to 150 percent on April 1,1989, before
declining to 139 percent on April 1, 1990. In the fourth year of our
sample, Firm X changed the formula determining the match rate. Starting April 1, 1991, the new formula resulted in a match rate of zero. Such
large swings in the match rate are unusual; Papke, Petersen, and Poterba
(1996) find that match rates typically exhibit strong persistence. Changes
in the match rate at Firm X were announced a few months before they
went into effect, thus allowing eligible employees ample time to adjust
their participation and contribution status.
There were no other major changes in Firm X's 401 (k) plan during
this time period. Employees could direct their contributions into a Standard and Poor (S&P) stock fund, a guaranteed income fund (GIC) with a
predetermined rate of return , or a company stock fund. Employer contributions were all placed in an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP),
and thus were invested in company stock.
Until April 1989, the firm also sponsored a "thrift plan" to which
employees could contribute using after-tax income. There was no employer match for this plan, but taxes on the capital income from plan
assets were deferred until the contributions were withdrawn. When both
plans were in effect, contributions were capped at 10 percent of salary for
each plan individually and 15 percent of salary for the two plans combined. 4 Firm X also provided a defined benefit retirement plan with benefits determined by average pay over the last five years of employment.
Our data set consists of annual observations on roughly 12,000 salaried
and nonunion hourly employees at Firm X for the years 1988 through
1991. Unionized hourly employees are not included in the dataset because they participated in a separate deferred compensation plan. The
data base was provided to us by Buck Consultants, a major benefits consulting firm. Of the workers eligible to participate in this plan in 1989, 8
percent were younger than 25 years of age, 58 percent were between 25
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TABLE

I Participation and Contribution Rates for the 401 (k) Plan at Firm X
1988

1989

1990

1991

82.4

82.3

83.4

78.0

5.8
6.0
52.0

6.0
6.0
50.3

6.4
6.0
44.0

5.8
6.0
51.8

84.0

83.8

82.6

82.3

6.0
6.0
48.3

6.3
6.0
37.7

6.3
6.0
39.2

6.0
6.0
42.1

55.0
65.0

129.0
150.0

142.0
139.0

34.7
0.0

Calculated from dollars contributed during the year (%)

Participation rate
Contribution rate of participants
Mean
Median
Fraction of employees
contributing <6 percent

Calculated from end-of-year contribution designationl (%)

Participation rate
Contribution rate of participants
Mean
Median
Fraction of employees
contributing <6 percent
Employer match rate
Annual average
Year-end

Source: Authors' calculations using data provided by Buck Consultants.
Note: Employees with unused corporate match contributions are defined as those making
actual contributions of less than 5\-" percent of salary (top panel) or those with year-end
designations ofle" than 6 percent (bottom panel).

and 45, 32 percent were between 45 and 65, and 2 percent were over 65.
Forty-seven percent earned Jess than $25,000, 23 percent earned between $25,000 and $40,000, and the remaining 30 percent earned more
than $40,000. About 75 percent of the eligible employees were men.
Table 1 presents summary statistics on contributor behavior during the
years 1988-91. 5 The overall participation rate, whether measured for the
401 (k) alone (as reported in the table) or for the 401 (k) and thrift plans
combined, was between 78 and 84 percent in all four years. These participation rates are higher than those reported in most surveys of 401 (k)
plans. For example, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994) report that data
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) suggest
that, in 1991, only 7I percent of workers eligible to participate in 401 (k)
plans did so. The difference is even more striking because household
survey responses are biased toward overstating the 401 (k) contribution
rate in any year. Our analysis counts only those employees making contributions to the plan in a given year as participants in that year. In some
surveys, individuals may be counted as participants if they have nonzero
balances in their 401 (k) accounts, regardless of whether they actually
contribute in a given year.
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Despite the very substantial changes in Firm X's employer match rates
over our sample period, the overall participation rate in the 401 (k) plan
varies little from year to year. One way to summarize this information is to
divide the change in the participation rate between two years, measured
for example using end-of-year contribution designations, by the change
in the end-of-year employer match rate. This calculation yields "derivative effects" of match rates on participation that are approximately zero
and vary in sign from year to year. The participation rate declined between 1988 and 1989, when the match rate increased from 65 percent to
150 percent. When the employer match was eliminated in 1991, the
contribution rate as calculated from dollars contributed during the year
declined by less than six percentage points; according to the data on endof-year designations, the contribution rate hardly changed at all. These
patterns raise questions about whether employer matching is a key factor
in explaining the rapid expansion of 401 (k) plans. 6
One potential explanation of the small responsiveness of participation
to the match rate at Firm X is that the employees are accustomed to big
swings in the employer match rate, make decisions for the "long haul,"
and do not make annual adjustments to the share of salary that they
contribute to the plan. Shefrin and Thaler (1988) and Thaler (1994)
suggest that 401 (k) participants may view contributions to the 401 (k)
plan as separate from other current income flows. Another potential
explanation for this insensitivity is that saving through 401 (k) accounts is
more attractive than saving through other channels without favorable tax
treatment, so those who are saving continue to contribute to these accounts even when the match rate is zero. The force of this argument is
somewhat diminished, however, by the observation noted below that
fewer than 20 percent of all participants contributed the full 10 percent
of salary allowable under the plan.
Changes in the match rate exhibit a more pronounced relationship
with the contribution rates of active participants. Between 1988 and
1990, the mean contribution rate rose by between one-half and onequarter percentage point, depending on which measure of the contribution rate one uses. In 1991, when the employer match was eliminated, the
increase in the mean contribution rate over the preceding three years
was reversed. The median 40I(k) contribution rate for participants held
steady at 6 percent of compensation, the maximum amount eligible for
the employer match, in all four years. 7
Another key indicator of contributor behavior is the fraction of employees who failed to exhaust the employer match, either by not contributing at all or by contributing less than 6 percent of their salary. These
employees passed up the opportunity to earn extraordinarily high returns on additional savings. For example, in 1989 these employees could

104

Employee Decisions and 4011kl Plans

have earned an immediate return of 150 percent in addition to the usual
benefits of tax-free accumulation in the 401 (k) plan. The fraction of
employees in this category fell by about one-fifth between 1988 and 1990,
the second year of the extraordinarily high match. Nonetheless, even in
1990, roughly 40 percent of employees failed to exhaust the employer
match.
The failure of employees to exhaust the employer match requires some
explanation. One possibility is that the participants who contributed less
than the match limit were liquidity constrained. Given the very high return on matched 401 (k) contributions, however, at least some individuals
close to retirement could profitably have borrowed even at credit card interest rates and used the proceeds to increase their 401 (k) contlibutions.
Even if liquidity constraints should not have been a relevant consideration for older workers, they may have been perceived as such by younger
workers because employees could not withdraw plan assets before age
591h unless they terminated employment with the firm. Firm X did not
allow "hardship" withdrawals from the 401 (k) plan, but plan participants
were allowed to borrow against their plan assets." Relatively few 401 (k)
participants at Firm X took advantage of the loan provisions. 1n 1988, for
example, just over 5 percent of plan members had outstanding loan
balances. This suggests that once assets are placed in a 401 (k) account,
contributors are unlikely to draw them down, at least so long as they
remain with the current employer. This pattern supports the notion that
contributions to 401 (k) plans are likely to remain invested for long periods and therefore to have a substantial impact on household net worth at
retirement.

The Importance of Contribution Limits
Firm X's 401 (k) plan is an attractive saving vehicle, with an after-tax rate
of return that exceeds that on traditional taxable saving instruments.
Precise delineation of the opportunity set confronted by eligible employees is complicated, however, because the marginal incentive to save
depends on various plan-specific and IRS-imposed rules and on the individual's contribution level.
At Firm X, an individual's contribution is limited to the smaller of 10
percent of compensation, a plan-imposed limit, or $7,000 (1987 dollars),
an IRS-imposed limit. Contributions of up to 6 percent of salary are
matched by the employer, while contributions of more than 6 percent are
not matched. Employees at Firm X who earned more than $116,667
(1987 dollars) would have reached the IRS-imposed limit on dollars contributed ($7,000) before exhausting the employer match. Both matched
and unmatched contributions are combined in the individual's account,
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2 Distribution of Employees and Contributions by Contribution Rate,
1990

Cont/ibution rate
(% ofsalary)

o
1-5
6
7-9
10
IRS maximum
$ contribution

End-ofyear
contribution eketion (%)
Empiuyees

17.4
21.8
37.4
3.3
18.9
0.9
0.2

Contributions

Contributions
during the year (%)
Empiuyees

Contributio/M

5.4

16.6
31.6
17.0
19.4

39.4

14.5

0.0
17.0
22.6
22.6
32.8
5.0

2.1
9.1
38.5

4.5
0.9

1.0
n.a.

n.a.

Source: Authors' calculations usinR data provided by Buck Consultants.
Note: Contributions for 1990 totaled $16.7 million, with lO,I140 conlributing employees.
The last row shows t'rnployees who chose to specify contribtllions as dollar amounts (other
than the IRS maximum).

and the balance accumulates at the pretax rate of return. 9 For the typical ern ployee, these rules induce two kinks in the budget set: one when
the employer match is exhausted at 6 percent of compensation, and
one when the plan's contribution limit is reached at 10 percent of
compensation.
Table 2 presents evidence on the imp0rlance of the various contribution consu"aints at Firm X. As in Table 1, we present results based on two
different measures of contribution status: the contribution rate recorded
at the end of the year and the effective annual contribution rate, calculated by dividing dollars contributed during the year by base pay earned
during the year. By either method, the kinks and corners in the budget
set appear to have played an extremely important part in determining
contributor behavior.
Measured by end-of-year contribution elections, three-quarters of
all employees were at one of the kinks or corners, contributing either
nothing, 6, or 10 percent of pretax base pay, or the maximum dollar
amount allowed by the IRS. Moreover, these employees accounted for
more than four-fifths of all dollars contributed. Nearly 40 percent of all
contributions came h"om employees contributing 6 percent of their salary; another 40 percent came from those contributing 10 percent; and
another 5 percent came from those contributing the maximum dollar
amount allowed by the IRS. The clustering of contributions at these
points is important because changes in the employer match rate may
have little or no effect on these contributions. Conversely, changes in
other plan parameters, including the fraCtion of compensation eligible
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for match and the ceilings on contributions specified by the plan and the
IRS, may have considerable influence on the level of 401 (k) saving.
The results based on the effective contribution rates, shown in the last
two columns of Table 2, are less striking, but they are still consistent with
the assertion that the constraints are very important. By this measure,
roughly half of all employees were at a kink or a corner, and 60 percent of
all dollars contributed were received from such employees.

Individual Characteristics and 401 (kJ Contribution
Behavior
Previous analysis of 401 (k) contribution rates - for example Poterba,
Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995) and Goodfellow and Schieber (1997) - has
shown that, in household survey data, 401 (k) participation and contribution rates are increasing functions of employee age and income. This is
usually interpreted as evidence that the probability that a given individual will participate in a given plan, and the amount he or she will contribute conditional on participation, rises with age and income. The observed pattern in cross-section household surveys, however, could arise
even if this description of individual behavior were false. If, for example,
the plans available to older workers tend to be more attractive than the
plans for younger workers, perhaps because of differences in the types of
firms that employ older and younger workers, then we might observe
rising age-participation profiles even if each individual's decision was
independent of age. By analyzing data from a single 401 (k) plan, we
avoid the possibility that unobserved plan characteristics are confounding our interpretation of individual behavior.
Table 3 reports information on how 401 (k) saving varied at the end
of 1989 with the characteristics of individual employees. As suggested
by previous work, participation rates (the upper panel) were greatest
among higher-income workers. Fully 95 percent of those earning more
than $40,000 were recorded as making contributions to the plan, and
participation among those earning between $25,000 and $40,000 was
almost as high. Age seems to be a relatively unimportant determinant of
participation for these income groups, but it does seem to have been
more important among those who earned less. In the $10,000-$25,000
income group, workers over the age of 45 participated at roughly the
same rates as upper-income employees of all ages, but younger workers
were much less likely to participate. 10
Consistent with the evidence from other studies, contribution rates
also varied across income and age categories, as the lower panel of Table
3 suggests. Among workers who earned more than $10,000, the average
contribution rate was an increasing function of both income and age.
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3 Participation and Mean Contribution Rates by Age and Income, 1989

Income
(thOUJands oJ$)

<25

25-45

Participation rates (% ofeligible population)
<10
13.8
28.0
10-25
62.1
78.4
25-40
88.8
85.2
>40
95.6
94.5
Total
45.4
78.4
Contribution rates (% ojeligible compensation)
<10
3.4
4.3
10-25
4.7
5.1
25-40
4.9
5.2
>40
6.3
6.6
Total
4.7
5.6

Age
45-65

>65

Total

28.7
85.5
86.8
96.6
85.2

7.0
51.7
85.7
90.6
33.8

22.9
78.4
85.9
95.3
82.3

5.3
6.1
6.5
7.9
6.9

3.3
5.9
6.7
7.5
6.4

5.4
5.7
7.1
6.0

4.4

Source: Authors' calculations using data provided by Buck ConsultantS.
Notf!: The population for the panel on contributions is amtribulors (i.e., the calculation is
performed conditional on knowing that the individual has a positive contribution rate).

Indeed, among workers who earned more than $40,000 and were at least
45 years old, the average contribution rate was about 8 percent. On
average, participants earning more than $40,000 contributed enough to
exhaust the employer match. Among workers earning $40,000 or less,
only those who were at least 45 years old contributed enough, on average,
to exhaust the employer match.

Dynamics of Contribution Behavior
Our panel data afford us an unusual opportunity to examine the dynamics of individual contributions over time. In particular, they allow us
to examine Papke, Petersen, and Poterba's (1996) coftiecture that the
high degree of persistence of participation and contribution rates at the
plan level is the result of inertia in individual decisions. Table 4 examines
the behavior of the 7,768 employees who were on the firm's payroll in all
four years of the sample. It shows that relatively few of these employees
altered their participation status during this period. Moreover, those
changes that did occur tended to coincide with the swings in the match
rate. Notably, between 1989 and 1990, a period when the match rate was
relatively stable, only about 2 percem of the sample changed its status;
more than 98 percent of the persons who made contributions in 1989
also made contributions in 1990, and 92 percent of noncontributors in
1989 remained non contributors in 1990. The largest change in participa-
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TARLE

4 Probabilities of Change in Contributor Status, 1988-1991
Cont,ibuti(JTl behavior in next year (%)

Rase year and status

Crmtribulor

Noncolltributor

J 988 contribution status
Contributor (84.1 %)
Noncontributor (15,9%)

99,1
63,0

0.9
37.0

J 989 wntribution slalus
Contributor (93.4%)
Noncontributor (6,6%)

98.4
7,8

1.6
92.2

1990 l'O'n17ibution slalus
Contributor (92.4%)
Noncontributor (7.6%)

92,8
3.7

7.2
96.3

Source: Authors' calculations using data provided by Buck Consultants.
Noli: The sample population is the set of employees who were at firm all fOUf years. Estimates of contribution status are based on dollars contributed during the year.

tion status occurred between 1988 and 1989, when the year-end match
rate jumped from 65 percent to 150 percent, and 63 percent of the 1988
noncontributors joined the plan.' I
A convenient way of summarizing the economic implications of the
transition probabilities in Table 4 is to calculate the steady-state distribution of employees that would obtain if those transition probabilities described employee behavior forever. Straightforward calculations show
that the transition probabilities for 1988-89, when the match rate was
increasing sharply, are consistent with a steady state in which 98.5 percent
of these long-term employees participate in the 401 (k) plan. By contrast,
the probabilities for 1989-90, when the match rate was about constant,
are consistent with a steady state in which 83 percent of these employees
participate in the plan. This is not much different from the average
participation rate actually observed over our sample. Finally, the transition probabilities between 1990 and 1991, when the match rate was falling, are consistent with a steady state in which only 34 percent of employees contribute to our plan.
We also tabulated the participation rate for individuals who joined the
firm during our sample to explore the possibility that new hires, many of
whom leave the firm after a short period, exhibit different behavior from
established employees. Not surprisingly, the participation rate among
new hires was lower than that among other workers: only about half of
this group participated, compared with an overall participation rate of
about 80 percent. The participation rate among those new hires in 1989
who left the firm in 1990 was only 6.5 percent. This suggests that individ-
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uals may make decisions about 401 (k) participation based in part on
their expected longevity at the firm.

Conclusion
Our results demonstrate two important features of 401 (k) plan participation. First, participants are heavily influenced by the various constraints
on their contributions. Three-quarters of eligible employees at the firm
we analyzed contributed nothing to the plan, or set their contributions
equal either to the maximum amount they could contribute or to the
amount at which the employer switched from matching to not matching
contributions. Second, there is substantial inertia in individual 401 (k)
contribution decisions. Most workers do not change the fraction of their
salary that they contribute to the plan from one year to the next, even
when the marginal employer match rate changes from more than 100
percent to zero. In particular, contrary to the results of Andrews (1992)
and Papke (1995), we see little evidence that workers respond to increases in the employer match rate by reducing their own contribution
rate.
The data from Firm X also suggest that, once a worker participates in a
401 (k) plan, he or she is unlikely to stop. This result supports the research strategy of studies such as Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1994, 1995)
that have compared the wealth of households that have been eligible for
401 (k) plans for different lengths of time to draw inferences about the
net effect ofthese plans on household net worth. Our findings of contributor inertia suggest that, conditional on contributing when a 401 (k) plan
becomes available, a contributor is likely to contribute in most subsequent years. This suggests that years of eligibility should be strongly correlated with total contributions.
Our findings suggest that further research on the effect of employer
match rates on contribution decisions must recognize the role of nonlinearities in the contribution opportunity set. The observation that most
contributors are at corners or kinks on this opportunity set suggests that
simple methods of calculating the elasticity of contributions with respect
to the employer match rate or other parameters of the plan may yield
rathel' unreliable answers. However, modeling the nonlinear budget
set facing potential 401 (k) contributors and applying the econometric
methods described in Hausman (1985) and Moffitt (1990) is complicated by the fact that the budget set facing each 401 (k) contributor is
age-dependent. The rate of relllrn an individual earns from tax-free accumulation depends in part on the number of years until he or she will
withdraw the funds from the 401 (k) account. One cannot therefore combine the simple model of 401 (k) constraints presented in this chapter
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with simple models of individual intertemporal choice to estimate a
structural model of 401 (k) contributor behavior. Moreover, in order to
implement a more sophisticated model in a satisfactory fashion, one
would need data on the rest of the household balance sheet and income
statement - data that are not available in the administrative records of
any employer.
Finally, we close with a brief glimpse at the portfolio allocation behavior of employees at Firm X. As we noted earlier, these employees
could invest their 401 (k) balances in three types of instruments: a GIC,
an S&P 500 stock index fund, and a fund wholly invested in the equity of
the firm. Barely 20 percent of employees directed any of their own contributions into the S&P 500 fund. At the same time, nearly 25 percent of
employees directed all of their contributions into the company stock
fund, and another 22 percent directed half of their contributions into
the company stock fund. These findings seem difficult to reconcile with
standard portfolio theory. They raise questions about the financial acumen of at least some 401 (k) participants.
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comments, and the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences,
the Federal Reserve Board, the National Institute on Aging, and the
National Science Foundation for research support. Opinions are those of
the authors and are not necessarily shared by the Board of Governors or
the other members of its staff.
Notes
1. Papke (1995) notes that employer contributions reported on the Form
5500 include any flat per-participant contributions made by the employer and
"helper" contributions made to pass the IRS nondiscrimination tests. Such contributions offer the employee no incentive to raise his or her own saving at the
margin.
2. If employers tend to adjust the fraction of salary that they will match at the
same time that they adjust match rates, then the difficulties of interpretation
noted above could apply to these results as well.
3. In focusing on individual-level records from a large employer, the current
paper parallels a number of recent papers on defined-benefit pension plans and
retirement decisions, such as Kotlikoff and Wise (1987, 1989), Lumsdaine, Stock
and Wise (1990, 1992), and Stock and Wise (1990a, 1990b).
4. Eliminating the thrift plan appears not to have affected the aggregate participation and contribution rates for the 401 (k) plan very much, in part because
relatively few workers could "replace" the thrift plan by joining the 401 (k) plan.
More than 90 percent of the roughly 1,500 thrift plan members in 1988 also
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contributed to the 401 (k) plan. Roughly three-quarters of those who were participating in both plans were already contributing enough to the 401 (k) to receive the full employer match, and many of them were at the contribution limit of
10 percent of salary. Of the 114 individuals who participated only in the thrift
plan in 1988, nearly two-thirds joined the 401 (k) in 1989.
5. We measure participation and contribution rates in two ways. The rates in
the upper panel are based on each employee's contributions to his or her 401 (k)
over the course of a year, divided by that employee's "base salary," while those in
the lower panel are based on the deferral percentage designated by the employee, as recorded with the plan at year end. The two measures of overall participation are essentially the same through 1990, but diverge sharply in 1991. The
mean and median contribution rates are about the same when computed using
the two approaches.
6. The stability of the participation rate in 1989 reflects two offsetting factors:
an increase in participation among persons who worked at Firm X in 1988 but did
not contribute to the 401(k) plan, and an influx of new workers who had very low
participation rates. For employees who were at Firm X in all four years of our data,
the participation rates based on contributions during the year were 84 percent
(1988),93 percent (1989), 92 percent (1990), and 86 percent (1991). Even for
this group, the movements in participation are small.
7. Since the match rate is related to past earnings per share at Firm X, changes
in the match rate may be associated with changes in the firm's future prospects.
This makes the small response to match rate changes even more striking, since
employees might associate reductions in the match rate with downward revisions
in their future labor earnings.
8. A loan amount could not exceed the least of: $50,000; half of the vested
amount; and 80 percent of the balance in the nonemployer account. The loan
rate was tied to the prime rate, with interest credited to the borrower's own
account. Borrowing did not limit the employee's ability to continue making
401 (k) contributions or affect the firm's matching contribution.
9. When the balance is withdrawn, taxes are due on the original contribution,
the employer match, and the investment return. In addition, withdrawals made
before an individual reaches age 59Y2-for example, when he or she changes
jobs - may be subject to a 10 percent federal penalty.
10. Twenty-three percent of workers with incomes below $10,000 belonged to
the plan in 1989. Some members of this group may have worked at Firm X for
only part of the year, so their reported income may understate their full-year
earnings.
11. The elimination of the thrift plan was a small factor as well. Also, some of
those who joined the 40 I (k) plan in 1989 may have been part-time workers who
were hired in 1988 and who were not eligible to participate in the 401 (k) plan
until one year after they joined the firm.
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